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Abstract
Resource allocation takes place in various types of real-world complex systems such as urban traf-
fic, social services institutions, economical and ecosystems. Mathematically, the dynamical process of
complex resource allocation can be modeled as minority games in which the number of resources is
limited and agents tend to choose the less used resource based on available information. Spontaneous
evolution of the resource allocation dynamics, however, often leads to a harmful herding behavior
accompanied by strong fluctuations in which a large majority of agents crowd temporarily for a few
resources, leaving many others unused. Developing effective control strategies to suppress and elim-
inate herding is an important but open problem. Here we develop a pinning control method. That
the fluctuations of the system consist of intrinsic and systematic components allows us to design a
control scheme with separated control variables. A striking finding is the universal existence of an
optimal pinning fraction to minimize the variance of the system, regardless of the pinning patterns
and the network topology. We carry out a detailed theoretical analysis to understand the emergence of
optimal pinning and to predict the dependence of the optimal pinning fraction on the network topol-
ogy. Our theory is generally applicable to systems with heterogeneous resource capacities as well as
varying control and network topological parameters such as the average degree and the degree dis-
tribution exponent. Our work represents a general framework to deal with the broader problem of
controlling collective dynamics in complex systems with potential applications in social, economical
and political systems.
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Resource allocation is an essential process in many real-world systems such as ecosystems of
various sizes, transportation systems (e.g., Internet, urban traffic grids, rail and flight networks),
public service providers (e.g., marts, hospitals, and schools), and social and economic organiza-
tions (e.g., banks and financial markets). The underlying system that supports resource allocation
often contains a large number of interacting components or agents on a hierarchy of scales, and
there are multiple resources available for each agent. As a result, complex behaviors are expected
to emerge ubiquitously in the dynamical evolution of resource allocation. In particular, in a typical
situation, agents or individuals possess similar capabilities in information processing and decision
making, and they share the common goal of pursuing as high payoffs as possible. The interactions
among the agents and their desire to maximize payoffs in competing for limited resources can lead
to vast complexity in the system dynamics.
Given resource-allocation system that exhibits complex dynamics, a defining virtue of optimal
performance is that the available resources are exploited evenly or uniformly by all agents in the
system. In contrast, an undesired or even catastrophic behavior is the emergence of herding, in
which a vast majority of agents concentrate on a few resources, leaving many other resources idle
or unused [1–12]. If this behavior is not controlled, the few focused resources would be depleted,
possibly directing agents to a different but still small set of resources. From a systems point of
view, this can lead to a cascading type of failures as resources are being depleted one after another,
eventually resulting in a catastrophic breakdown of the system on a global scale. In this paper, we
analyze and test an effective strategy to control herding dynamics in complex resource-allocation
systems.
A universal paradigm to model and understand the interactions and dynamical evolutions in
many real world systems is complex adaptive systems [13–15], among which minority game
(MG) [16, 17] stands out as a particularly pertinent framework for resource allocation. MG dynam-
ics was introduced by Challet and Zhang to address the classic El Farol bar-attendance problem
conceived by Arthur [18]. In an MG system, each agent makes choice (e.g., + or −, to attend a
bar or to stay at home) based on available global information from the previous round of interac-
tion. The agents who pick the minority strategy are rewarded, and those belonging to the majority
group are punished due to limited resources. The MG dynamics has been studied extensively in
the past [17, 19–36].
To analyze, understand, and exploit the MG dynamics, there are two theoretical approaches:
mean field approximation and Boolean dynamics. The mean field approach was mainly devel-
oped by researchers from the statistical-physics community to cast the MG problem in the general
framework of non-equilibrium phase transitions [16, 17, 37, 38]. In the Boolean dynamics, for
any agent, detailed information about the other agents that it interacts with is assumed to be avail-
able, and the agent responds accordingly [1–4, 9–12]. Both approaches can lead to “better than
random” performance in resource utilization. However, herding behavior in which many agents
take identical action [39] can also take place, which has been extensively studied and recognized
as one important factor contributing to the origin of complexity that leads to enhanced fluctuations
and, consequently, to significant degradation in efficiency [1–12].
The control strategy we analyze in this paper is the pinning method that has been studied in
controlling the collective dynamics, such as synchronization, in complex networks [11, 40–46].
For the general setting of pinning control, the two key parameters are the “pinning fraction,” the
fraction of agents chosen to hold a fixed strategy, and the “pinning pattern,” the configuration
of plus or minus strategies assigned to the pinned agents. Our previous work [11] treated the
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special case of two resources of identical capacities, where the pinning pattern was such that
the probabilities of agents pinned to positive or negative strategies (to be defined later) are
equal. Here, we investigate a more realistic model setting and articulate a general mathematic
control framework. A striking finding is that biased pinning control pattern can lead to an
optimal pinning fraction for a variety of network topologies, so that the system efficiency can be
improved remarkably. We develop a theoretical analysis based on the mean-field approximation
to understand the non-monotonic behavior of the system efficiency about the optimal pinning
fraction. We also study the dependence of the optimal fraction on the topological features of
the system, such as the average degree and heterogeneity, and obtain a theoretical upper bound
of the system efficiency. The theoretical predictions are validated with extensive numerical
simulations. Our work represents a general framework to optimally control the collective dynam-
ics in complex MG systems with potential applications in social, economical and political systems.
Results
Boolean dynamics. In the original Boolean system, a population of N agents compete for
two alternative resources, denoted as r = + and r = −, which have the same accommodating
capacity C+ = C− = N/2. Similar to the MG dynamics, only the agents belonging to the global
minority group are rewarded by one unit of payoff. As a result, the profit of the system is equal to
the number of agents selecting the resource with attendance less than the accommodating capacity,
which constitute the global-minority group. The dynamical variable of the Boolean system is
denoted as At, the number of + agents in the system at time step t. The variance of At about the
capacity C+ characterizes the efficiency of the system. The densities of the + and − agents in
the whole system are ρ+ = At/N and ρ− = 1 − ρ+, respectively. The state of the system can be
conveniently specified by the column vector ρˆ = (ρ+, ρ−)T.
A Boolean system has two states (a binary state system), in which agents make decision ac-
cording to the local information from immediate neighbors. The neighborhood of an agent is
determined by the connecting structure of the underlying network. Each agent receives inputs
from its neighboring agents and updates its state according to the Boolean function, a function that
generates either + and− from the inputs [3]. Realistically, for any agent, global information about
the minority choice from all other agents at the preceding time step may not be available. Under
this circumstance, the agent attempts to decide the global minority choice based on neighbors’
previous strategies. To be concrete, we assume [4, 11] that agent i with ki neighbors chooses + at
time step t + 1 with the probability
Pi→⊕ = ρ
i
− ≡ ni−(t)/[ni+(t) + ni−(t)], (1)
and chooses − with the probability Pi→⊖ = 1 − Pi→⊕, where ni+(t) and ni−(t), respectively, are
the numbers of + and − neighbors of i at time step t, with ki = ni+(t)+ni−(t). The expressions of
probabilities, however, are valid only under the assumption that the two resources have the same
accommodating capacity, i.e., C+ = C−. In real-world resource allocation systems, typically we
have C+ 6= C−. Consider, for example, the extreme case of C+ ≫ C−. Suppose we have ρi+ = ρi−
for agent i. In this case, rationality demands a stronger preference to the resource + (i.e., with
a higher probability). To investigate the issues associated with the control of realistic Boolean
dynamics, we define[
Pi→⊕
Pi→⊖
]
= F · ρˆi ≡
[
F+|+ F+|−
F−|+ F−|−
]
·
[
ρi+
ρi−
]
, (2)
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where F is the response function of each agent to its local environment ρˆi, i.e., the local neighbor’s
configuration with ρi+ = ni+(t)/ki and ρi− = ni−(t)/ki. The quantity Fr|r′ (or Fr|r) characterizes
the contribution of the r′-neighbors (or r-neighbors) to the probability for i to adopt r. The quantity
Fr|r represents the strength of assimilation effect among the neighbors, while Fr|r′ quantifies the
dissimilation effect. Intuitively, the resource with a larger accommodating capacity would have
a stronger assimilation effect among agents. By definition, the elements in each column in the
matrix F satisfy Fr|r′+Fr′|r′ = 1, i.e., the total probability for an agent to choose + and− is unity.
Using the mean-field assumption that the configuration of neighbors is uniform over the whole
system, i.e., ρi+ = ρ+, we have that the stable solution for Eq. (2) satisfies ρˆ = F · ρˆ, which leads
to the eigenstate of F as
ρˆ∗ =

 ρ
∗
+
ρ∗−

 =


F+|−
F+|−+F−|+
F−|+
F+|−+F−|+

 . (3)
The rational response (F) of agents to nonidentical accommodation capacities of resources will
lead to the equality ρ∗+/ρ∗− = C+/C−, i.e., the stable fraction of the agent densities in + and − is
simply the ratio of the capacities. The elements of F can then be defined accordingly using this
ratio and the condition 0 ≤ Fr|r′ ≤ 1, which characterizes a stronger preference to the resource
with a larger capacity. For the specific case of identical-capacity resources, we have F+|− = F−|+,
and the solution reduces to the result ρˆ∗ = (0.5, 0.5)T of the original Boolean dynamics [4, 11].
The optimal solution for the resource allocation is A∗ = Nρ∗+.
A general measure of Boolean system’s performance is the variance of At with respect to the
capacity C+:
σ2 =
1
T
T∑
t=1
(A(t)− C+)2, (4)
which characterizes, over a time interval T , the statistical deviations from the optimal resource
utilization [4]. A smaller value of σ2 indicates that the resource allocation is more optimal. A
general phenomenon associated with Boolean dynamics is that, as agents strive to join the minority
group, an undesired herding behavior can emerge, as characterized by large oscillations in A(t).
Our goal is to understand, for the general setting of nonidentical resource capacities, the effect of
pinning control on suppressing/eliminating the herding behavior.
Pinning control scheme. Our basic idea to control the herding behavior is to “pin” certain
agents to freeze their states so as to realize optimal resource allocation, following the general
principle of pinning control of complex dynamical networks [11, 40–46]. Let ρp be the fraction
of agents to be pinned, so the fraction of unpinned (or free) nodes is ρf = 1 − ρp. The numbers
of the two different types of agents, respectively, are Nf = N · ρf and Np = N · ρp. The free
agents make choices according to local time-dependent information, for whom the inputs from the
pinned agents are fixed.
The two basic quantities characterizing a pinning control scheme are the order of pinning (the
way how certain agents are chosen to be pinned) and the pinning pattern [11]. We adopt the degree-
preferential pinning (DPP) strategy in which the agents are selected to be pinned according to their
connectivity or degrees in the underlying network. In particular, agents of higher degrees are more
likely to be pinned. This pinning strategy originated from the classic control method to mitigate
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the effects of intentional attacks in complex networks [47–49]. The selection of the pinning pattern
can be characterized by the fractions η+ and η− of the pinned agents that select r = + and r = −,
respectively, where η++η− = 1. The quantities η+ and η− are thus the pinning pattern indicators.
Different from the previous work [11] that investigated the specific case of η+ = η− = 0.5 (half-
half pinning pattern), here we consider the more general case where η+ is treated as a variable.
The pinning schemes are implemented on random networks and scale-free networks with different
values of the scaling exponent γ in the power-law degree distribution [50, 51] P (k) ∼ k−γ . As
we will see below, one uniform optimal pinning fraction ρp exists for various values of the pinning
pattern indicator η+.
Simulation Results. To gain insight, we first study the original Boolean dynamics with
C+/C− = 1 and F = (0, 1; 1, 0) for different values of the pinning pattern indicator η+. The
game dynamics are implemented on scale-free networks of size N = 1001 and of the scaling ex-
ponent γ = 3.0 with the average degree 〈k〉 ranging from 6 to 40. The DPP scheme is performed
with pinning fraction ρp and η+ values ranging from 0.5 (i.e., half-half pinning) to 1.0 (i.e., all to +
pinning). The variance σ2 versus ρp for different values of η+ and different degree 〈k〉 are shown
in Fig. 1. We see that, in general, systems with larger values of η+ exhibit larger variance, imply-
ing that a larger deviation of η+ from the ratio of the capacity C+/N can lead to lower efficiency
in resource allocation. Surprisingly, there exists a universal optimal pinning fraction (denoted by
ρ∗p) about 0.4, where the variance σ2 is minimized and exhibits an opposite trend for ρp > ρ∗p, i.e.,
larger values of η+ result in smaller values of σ2. The implication is that, deviations of η+ from
C+/N provide an opportunity to achieve better performance (with smaller variances σ2), due to
the non-monotonic behavior of σ2 with ρp. To understand the emergence of the optimal pinning
fraction ρ∗p, we see from Fig. 1 that the values of ρ∗p are approximately identical for different values
of η+, which decrease with the average degree 〈k〉. As we will see below, in the large degree limit
k →∞, the value of σ2 can be predicted theoretically (c.f., Fig. 4).
Simulations using scale-free networks of different degrees of heterogeneity also indicate the
existence of the universal optimal pinning control strategy, as can be seen from the behaviors
of the variance calculated from scale-free networks of different degree exponents (Fig. 2),
where smaller values of γ point to a stronger degree of heterogeneity of the system. We see
that an optimal value of ρ∗p exists for all cases, which decreases only slightly with γ, i.e., more
heterogeneous networks exhibit larger values of the optimal pinning fraction ρ∗p, a phenomenon
that can also be predicated theoretically (c.f., Fig. 5).
Theoretical Analysis
The phenomenon of the existence of a universal optimal pinning fraction ρ∗p, independent
of the specific values of pinning pattern indicator η+, is remarkable. Here we develop a
quantitative theory to explain this phenomenon.
To begin, we note that MG is effectively a stochastic dynamical process due to the randomness
in the selection of strategies by the agents. The variance of the system, a measure of the efficiency
of the system, is determined by two separated factors. The first, denoted as X1(δ), is the intrinsic
fluctuations of A about its expected value A∗, defined as δ ≡√〈(A− A∗)2〉, which can be calcu-
lated once the stable distribution of attendance P (A) is known, where P (A) can be obtained either
analytically (c.f., Fig. 3) or numerically. The second factor, denoted as X2(ε), is the difference of
the expected value A∗ from the capacity C+ of the system: ε ≡ A∗−C+, which leads to a constant
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contribution to the variance of the system. Taking into account the two factors, we can write the
system variance σ2 [defined in Eq. (4)] as
σ2 ≡ 〈(A− C+)2〉 = 〈(A− A∗ + A∗ − C+)2〉 = δ2 + ε2, (5)
a direct summation of the two factors X1(δ) = δ2 and X2(ε) = ε2. In contrast to the simplified
case discussed in the previous works [4, 11], the expected value A∗ in the dynamical process is not
necessarily equal to the capacity C+. Nonzero values of ε are a result of biased pinning pattern
(η+ 6= 0.5) or improper response to the capacities of resources. In addition, recent studies of flux-
fluctuation law in complex systems also found that, the variance of the system is determined by
the two factors: the intrinsic fluctuation and the systematic external drives [52–58].
Stable distribution of attendance. To quantify the process of biased pinning control, we
derive a discrete-time master equation and then discuss the effect of network topology on control.
Discrete-time master equation for biased pinning control. To understand the response of the
Boolean dynamics to pinning control with varied values of the pinning pattern indicator η+, we
generalize our previously developed analysis [11]. Let Pp be the probability for a neighbor of one
given free agent to be pinned so that the probability of encountering a free agent is Pf = 1 − Pp.
The transition probability of the system from A(t) to A(t+1) can be expressed in terms of η+. In
particular, note that the state transition is due to updating of the Nf free agents, as the remaining
Np agents are fixed. To simplify notations, we set A(t) = i, A(t + 1) = k, and A(t + 2) = j, for
i, k, j ∈ [0, N ]. The conditional transition probability from i at t to k at t+ 1 is
P (k, t+ 1|i, t) =
(
Nf
k −Npη+
)
× (Ppη− + PfNf − (i−Npη+)
Nf
)k−Npη+
×(Ppη+ + Pf i−Npη+
Nf
)Nf−(k−Npη+), (6)
where Ppη− + Pf [Nf − (i − Npη+)]/Nf is the probability for a free agent to choose + with
the first and second terms representing the contributions of the pinned − and free − neighbors,
respectively. In the Boolean system, the values of attendance A oscillate about its equilibrium
value [11]. The transition probability between the state at t and t + 2 can be expressed as a
function of η+:
T (j, i) ≡ P (j, t+ 2|i, t) =
∑
k
P (j, t+ 2|k, t+ 1) · P (k, t+ 1|i, t)
=
∑
k
{[
(
Nf
k −Npη+
)
× (Ppη− + PfNf − i+Npη+
Nf
)k−Npη+
×(Ppη+ + Pf i−Npη+
Nf
)Nf−(k−Npη+)]
×[
(
Nf
j −Npη+
)
× (Ppη− + PfNf − k +Npη+
Nf
)j−Npη+
×(Ppη+ + Pf k −Npη+
Nf
)Nf−(j−Npη+)]}. (7)
Equation (7) takes into account the effect of pinning patterns, which was ignored previously [11].
The resulting balance equation governing the dynamics of the Markov chains becomes
P (j) =
∑
i
P (j, t+ 2|i, t)P (i) ≡
∑
i
T (j, i)P (i), (8)
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which is the discrete-time master equation. The stable state that the system evolves into can be
defined in the matrix form as
PA = TPA, (9)
where T is an (N +1)× (N +1) matrix with elements Tji = T (j, i), and PA is the corresponding
vector of P (A) with A ranging from 0 to N .
The probability distribution P (A) is a binomial function with various expectation values, as
shown in Fig. 3. In addition, the probability P (A) is zero for A ∈ [0, Npη+] ∪ [Np(1 − η+), N ],
which defines the boundary condition in the sense that there are Np = N · ρp pinned agents. Once
the stable distribution P (A) is obtained from Eq. (9), the cumulative variance of the system can
be calculated from
σ2 =
N∑
A=0
P (A)(A− C+)2. (10)
The theoretical prediction of σ2 as a function of ρp can thus be made through (a) identifying the
function Pp(ρp), (b) defining the matrix T that depends on η+ and Pp(ρp), and (c) calculating the
stable state P (A).
Effect of network topology on pinning control. The topology of the network system has an
effect on the probability Pp. For the particular case of scale-free networks with degree exponent
γ = 3, our previous work [11] demonstrated that preferential pinning of the large-degree agents
leads to Pp =
√
ρp. Here, we consider systems with degree distribution P (k) = (γ−1)/(k1−γmin kγ),
where kmin is the minimum degree of the network. For the DPP scheme where pinning occurs in
the order from large to small degree agents, the relation between the minimum degree of pinned
agents (denoted by k′) and the pinning fraction ρp is
ρp(k
′) =
∫ kmax
k′
P (k)dk. (11)
For a given pinning fraction ρp(k′) in which all the agents with k > k′ are pinned, the probability
Pp for one neighbor of a given free agent to be a pinned agent is given by
Pp(k
′) =
∫ kmax
k′
kP (k)dk∫ kmax
kmin
kP (k)dk
. (12)
Equations (11) and (12) are applicable to DPP scheme on networks of any degree distribution
P (k). For a scale-free network, Pp as a function of ρp can be expressed as
Pp(ρp) = (
k′
kmin
)
2−γ
= ρp
2−γ
1−γ . (13)
For the special case of γ = 3, Eq. (13) reduces to the specific relationship obtained earlier [11]:
Pp(ρp) =
√
ρp. As indicated by Eqs. (7-10), the specific form of matrix T with respect to ρp can
be obtained by substituting Eq. (13) into Eq. (7), leading to the distribution P (A) and finally the
variance of the system σ2 as a function of ρp. Figure 4 displays the theoretical predicted σ2 (dashed
curves) for various values of the pinning fraction ρp and of the pinning pattern indicator η+. The
trend and, more importantly, the existence of the optimal pinning fraction ρ∗p, agree well with the
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simulation results (marked with different symbols). In the limit 〈k〉 → ∞, the system approaches
a well-mixed state that can be fully characterized by Eq. (13), indicating that the simulation results
approach the curve predicted by the mean-field theory as the average degree 〈k〉 is increased.
Figure 5 shows the theoretical prediction of σ2 for scale-free networks with different values of
the degree exponent γ, which agrees well with the results from direct simulation as in Fig. 2. For
the case of highly heterogeneous networks (γ = 2.1), the theoretical prediction deviates slightly
from the numerical results for the reason that the networks in simulation inevitably exhibit certain
topological features that are not taken into account in the theoretical analysis of Pp(ρp), such as
the degree associativity.
Optimal pinning. Our analysis based on the master equation (8) applies to systems with
F+|− = F−|+ = 1 and identical resource capacity. We now consider the more general case of
varying F values to further understand the optimal pinning control scheme.
Deviation of expected attendance from resource capacity. The dependence of A∗ on η+ can be
obtained through the general form of the response matrix F. For convenience, we use the column
vector ηˆ = (η+, η−)T to denote the fraction of the agents pinned at + and −, where η+ + η− = 1,
ωˆ = (ω+, ω−)
T is the fraction of free agents adopting strategies + and −, respectively, with
ω+ + ω− = 1. The state of the system can be expressed as ρˆ(t) = ρpηˆ + ρf ωˆ(t), from which we
have
ωˆ(t) = [ρˆ(t)− ρpηˆ]/ρf , (14)
At the next time step, the expected value of the state based on ρˆ(t) through the response matrix F
can be written as
ρˆ(t + 1) = ρpηˆ + ρf [PpFηˆ + PfFωˆ(t)]. (15)
Substituting Eq. (14) into Eq. (15), we get the relationship between ρˆ(t + 1) and ρˆ(t). A self-
consistency process stipulated by Eqs. (14) and (15) can yield the stable state of the system with
the expected number of agents choosing + given by
A∗ = N
F+|−(ρp − 1)− ρpη+(F+|− + F−|+) + η+Pp(F+|− + F−|+ − 1)
Pp(F+|− + F−|+ − 1)− (F+|− + F−|+) . (16)
In a free system without pinning, the rational response F of agents to nonidential capacities of
resources leads to Eq. (3), implying the relationship C+ = NF+|−/(F+|−+F−|+). From Eq. (16),
we can obtain ε as a function of the value of the pinning pattern indicator η+, the elements of the
matrix F, the pinning fraction ρp, and the parameter Pp associated with network topology. We
have
ε = A∗ − C+ = N · [F+|−(η+ − 1) + F−|+η+] ·
[ρp(F+|− + F−|+)− Pp(F+|− + F−|+ − 1)]
(F+|− + F−|+) · [F+|− + F−|+ − (F−|+ + F−|+ − 1)Pp] , (17)
which has the form of separated variables associated with η+ and ρp.
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Optimal pinning pattern and fraction. Optimizing the system requires minimum X2(ε), i.e.,
ε = 0 in Eq. (17), leading to two independent solutions:
η∗+
η∗−
=
F+|−
F−|+
=
C+
C−
, (18a)
Pp(ρ
∗
p) =
F+|− + F−|+
F+|− + F−|+ − 1ρ
∗
p, (18b)
which respectively correspond to the optimal value of the pinning pattern indicator η∗+ and the
optimal pinning fraction ρ∗p. Here, for convenience, we define a parameter: β ≡ (F+|− +
F−|+)/(F+|−+F−|+−1) so that Eq. (18b) can be expressed concisely as Pp(ρ∗p) = β ·ρ∗p. Once the
values of η+ and ρp satisfy either Eq. (18a) or Eq. (18b), we can obtain X2(ε) = 0. The variance
σ2 depends on the fluctuation factor X1(δ) only.
Equation (18a) specifies the pinning pattern with the same ratio as that of the resource capacity.
The Boolean dynamics studied previously [11] is a special case where the optimal pinning pattern
indicator is η∗+/η∗− = 1 for systems with C+ = C−, and the variance σ2 is simply determined by
the factor X1(δ).
From Eq. (18b), we see that the optimal pinning fraction ρ∗p is independent of η+ but depends
on both the network structure through Pp(ρp) and on the response function F. Additionally, the
condition ρp ∈ [0, 1] and nonzero denominator require
F+|− + F−|+ − 1 > 0. (19)
The function Pp(ρp) for scale-free networks, as in Eq. (13), increases monotonically with ρp.
Figure 6(a) displays the curves y1 = Pp(ρp) and y2 = β · ρp, i.e., both sides of Eq. (18b). The
existence of nonzero ρ∗p for y1 = y2 demands
dPp(ρp)
dρp
|ρp=0 > β. (20)
For scale-free networks, Pp(ρp) diverges at ρp = 0. Equation (20) thus holds, implying that the
DPP pinning scheme has a nonzero optimal pinning fraction ρ∗p, leading to ε = 0. However, for
homogeneous networks, Eq. (20) may not hold. In this case, a more specific implicit condition
can be obtained from Eq. (20) through the following analysis. In particular, without an analytical
expression of Pp(ρp), the derivative of Pp(ρp) with respect to ρp can be obtained from Eqs. (11)
and (12):
dPp(ρp)
dρp
=
dPp(k
′)
dk′
· dk
′
dρp(k′)
=
k′P (k′)
〈k〉P (k′) =
k′
〈k〉 . (21)
For degree preferential pinning, in the limit ρp → 0, the maximum degree for free agents is
k′ → kmax. We thus have
dPp(ρp)
dρp
|ρp=0 =
kmax
〈k〉 > β, (22)
which requires that the network be heterogeneous. For F+|− = F−|+ = 1, we have kmax/〈k〉 > 2,
ensuring the existence of a nonzero ρ∗p value for ε = 0.
The contour map of the optimal pinning fraction ρ∗p in the parameter space of F+|− and F−|+ for
scale-free networks with γ = 3 is shown in Fig. 6(b). The boundary F+|− + F−|+ = 1 associated
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with condition Eq. (19) is represented by the white dashed line, where nonzero solutions of ρ∗p do
not exist below the lower-left region. Figures 6(c) and 6(d) show ρ∗p for ε = 0 as a function of
1/β for scale-free and random networks, respectively, where F−|+ is varied and F+|− is fixed to
0.9. The theoretical prediction of ρ∗p [red solid curve in (c) and red open circle in (d)] is given
by the intersections of the curves y1 and y2 in Fig. 6(a). For scale-free networks, since Eq. (20)
holds, Eq. (19) is the only constraint on the value of 1/β (red dashed arrow), with the region at
the right-hand side yielding nonzero ρ∗p solutions. The red solid curve in Fig. 6(c) represents the
theoretical prediction, and the open squares denote the simulation results from scale-free networks
of size N = 2001, power-law exponent γ = 3, and average degree 〈k〉 = 40.
For random networks, the existence of nonzero ρ∗p solutions requires that Eqs. (19) and (21)
or (22) hold. For the Poisson degree distribution, the maximum degree of the network can be
calculated from
e−kmax〈k〉
kmax!
≈ 1
N
. (23)
We can obtain an estimate of the value of 1/β that satisfies Eq. (22), as indicated by the blue arrow
(labeled as boundary 2) in Fig. 6(d). The right-hand side of this point satisfies both Eqs. (19) and
(22), implying the existence of nonzero ρ∗p. Comparison of the results from random and scale-free
networks with different scaling exponents (Figs. 2, 5 and 6) shows that, stronger heterogeneity
tends to enhance the values of ρ∗p, which can also be seen from Eq. (20).
To better understand the non-monotonic behavior of σ2 with ρp, we provide a physical picture
of the behavioral change for ρp greater or less than ρ∗p. The effect of pinning control is determined
by the number of edges between pinned and free agents, which are pinning-free edges. For a
small pinning fraction ρp, the average effect per pinned agent on the system (represented by the
number of pinned-free edges per pinned agent) is relatively large. However, as ρp is increased,
the average impact is reduced for two reasons: (a) an increase in the edges within the pinned
agents’ community itself (i.e., two connected pinned agents), which has no effect on control, and
(b) a decrease in the number of free agents, which directly reduces the number of pinned-free
edges. Consider the special case of η+ = 1 and C+ = C−. For small ρp, the pinned + agents
have a significant impact so that the free agents tend to overestimate the probability of winning by
adopting −. In this case, the expected value A∗ is smaller than 0.5N , corresponding to ε < 0. For
highly heterogeneous systems, the average impact per pinned agent is larger for a given small value
of ρp. As ρp is increased, the average influence per pinned agent reduces and, consequently, A∗
restores towards 0.5N . For A∗ = 0.5N and ε = 0, the system variance [Eq. (5)] is minimized due
to X2(ε) = 0, and the corresponding pinning fraction achieves the optimal value ρ∗p. For strongly
heterogeneous systems, due to the large initial average impact caused by pinning the hub agents,
the optimal pinning fraction ρ∗p appears in the larger ρp region. Further increase in ρp with η+ = 1
will lead to ε > 0 and A∗ > 0.5N , thereby introducing nonzero X2(ε) again and, consequently,
generating an increasing trend in σ2.
Collapse of variance. For certain networks, the variance σ2(η+, ρp) is determined by the val-
ues of the pinning pattern indicator η+ and the pinning fraction ρp. Our analysis so far focuses on
the contribution of X2(ε) to the variance σ2 as the pinning fraction ρp is increased but for fixed
η+. It is thus useful to define a quantity related to the variance σ2, which can be expressed in the
form of separated variables. For two different values of the pinning pattern indicator, η+ and η′+,
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for a given value of ρp, the relative weight of X2(ε) can be obtained from Eq. (17) as
λ(η+, η
′
+, ρp) ≡
X2(ε(η+, ρp))
X2(ε(η′+, ρp))
= [
ε(η+, ρp)
ε(η′+, ρp)
]2 = [
F+|−(η+ − 1) + F−|+η+
F+|−(η
′
+ − 1) + F−|+η′+
]2, (24)
where ε(η+, ρp) is a function of both η+ and ρp. Remarkably, the ratio λ depends on η+ and η′+
but it is independent of ρp, due to the form of separated variables in Eq. (17). From the simple
relationship Eq. (24), we can define the relative changes in these quantities due to an increase in
the value of η+ from a reference value η′+ as
Π(η+, η
′
+, ρp) ≡
σ2(η+, ρp)− σ2(η′+, ρp)
σ2(η′+, ρp)
, (25)
Ω(η+, η
′
+) ≡
X2(ε(η+))−X2(ε(η′+))
X2(ε(η′+))
, (26)
and then obtain the change rate associated with σ2 and X2(ε) as,
κ(η+, η
′
+, ρp) = Π(η+, η
′
+, ρp)/Ω(η+, η
′
+), (27)
where Ω(η+, η′+) is independent of ρp. In the limit (η+−η′+)→ 0, the rate of change κ(η+, η′+, ρp)
becomes
κ(η′+, ρp) =
∂ ln[σ2(η′+, ρp)]
∂η′+
/
d ln[X2(ε(η
′
+))]
dη′+
. (28)
Figure 7 shows κ(η′+, ρp) as a function of ρp for scale-free networks, where the value of the
reference pinning pattern indicator is η′+ = 0.6. To obtain the values of κ, we first calculate Ω by
substituting the values of η+, η′+ and the elements of F into Eqs. (24) and (26). We then obtain Π
by substituting the values of σ2 into Eq. (25), with σ2 either from simulation as in Figs. 1 and 2
or from theoretical analysis as in Fig. 5. We see that the κ values from simulation results of σ2
[Figs. 7(a-c) marked by “Simulation Results”] and theoretical prediction of σ2 [Figs. 7(d-f) marked
by “Theoretical Results”] show the behavior in which the curves of κ for different values of η+
collapse into a single one. This indicates that κ depends solely on the pinning fraction ρp; it is
independent of the value of the pinning pattern indicator η+. Extensive simulations and analysis
of scale-free networks with different average degree 〈k〉 or different degree exponent γ verify the
generality of the collapsing behavior.
From Eq. (28), we see that the variance σ2(η+, ρp) and the quantity κ are closely related. For
example, a smaller value of κ indicates that X2(ε) contributes more to the variance of σ2(η+, ρp) as
η+ is changed, and vice versa. In Fig. 7, κ = 0 corresponds to the intersecting points of the curves
of σ2 with different values of η+ shown in Figs. 1, 2, and 5. It can also be verified analytically
that, the minimal point with ∂κ/∂ρp = 0 coincides with the optimal pinning fraction ρ∗p at which
σ2 is minimized, which is supported by simulation results in Figs. 7, 1, 2, and 5.
Variance in the form of separated variables. From Eq. (27), for a given value of the reference
pinning pattern indicator η′+, we can obtain an expression of Π in the form of separated variables
as
Π(η+, ρp) = κ(ρp) · Ω(η+), (29)
where κ(ρp) is independent of the change in η+, and Ω(η+) is independent of ρp. The consequence
of Eq. (29) is remarkable, since it defines in the parameter space (η+, ρp) a function Π in the form
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of separated variables which, as compared with the original quantity σ2, not only simplifies the
description but also gives a more intuitive picture of the system behavior. Specifically, for the MG
dynamics, the influences of various factors on the variance σ2 or Π(η+, ρp) can be classified into
two parts: (I) the function κ that reflects the effects of the pinning fraction ρp and the network
structure among agents (in terms of the degree distribution P (k), the average degree 〈k〉, and the
scaling exponent γ), and (II) the function Ω that characterizes the impact of the pinning pattern
indicator η+ and the response of agents to resource capacities C+ and C− through F. Figures 8(a)
and 8(b) show the values of κ as a function of ρp for η′+ = 0.7 and 0.8, respectively, whereas
Fig. 8(c) shows Ω(η+) for several values of η′+. From Eqs. (24) and (26), we see that Ω is a
quadratic function of η+ with the symmetry axis at η+ = F+|−/(F+|− + F−|+), which depends on
the setting of response function F. The second derivative of the function depends on η′+.
From the definition in Eq. (25), the variance of the system for arbitrary values of ρp and η+ can
be obtained as
σ2(η+, ρp) = [κ(ρp) · Ω(η+) + 1] · σ2(η′+, ρp), (30)
where η′+ specifies the reference pinning pattern. Once we have the two respective σ2(η+, ρp)
curves for the two specific pinning patterns as specified by η′+ and η′′+, σ2 in the whole param-
eter space (η+, ρp) can be calculated accordingly. In particular, the quantities σ2(η′+, ρp) and
σ2(η′′+, ρp) serve as a holographic representation of the dynamical behavior of the system in the
whole parameter space. In particular, one can first obtain Ω(η+) from Eqs. (17) and (26), and then
calculate κ(ρp) = Π(η′′+, ρp)/Ω(η′′+), and finally obtain the value of σ2(η+, ρp) by substituting
Ω(η+) and κ(ρp) into Eq. (30).
Discussions
The phenomenon of herding is ubiquitous in social and economical systems. Especially, in
systems that involve and/or rely on fair resource allocation, the emergence of herding behavior
is undesirable, as in such a state a vast majority of the individuals in the system share only a few
resources, a precursor of system collapse at a global scale. A generic manifestation of herding
behavior is relatively large fluctuations in the dynamical variables of the system such as the
numbers of individuals sharing certain resources. It is thus desirable to develop effective control
strategies to suppress herding. An existing and powerful mathematical framework to model
and understand the herding behavior is minority games. Investigating control of herding in the
MG framework may provide useful insights into developing more realistic control strategies for
real-world systems.
Built upon our previous works in MG systems [4, 11], in this paper we articulate, test, and
analyze a general pinning strategy to control herding behavior in MG systems. A striking finding
is the universal existence of an optimal pinning fraction that minimizes the fluctuations in the
system, regardless of system details such as the degree of homogeneity of the resource capacities,
topology and structures of the underlying network, and different patterns of pinning. This means
that, generally, the efficiency of the system can be optimized for some relatively small pinning
fraction. Employing the mean-field approach, we develop a detailed theory to understand and
predict the dynamics of the MG system subject to pinning control, for various network topologies
and pinning schemes. The key observation underlying our theory is the two factors contributing
to the system fluctuations: intrinsic dynamical fluctuations and systematic deviation of agents’
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expected attendance from resource capacity. The theoretically predicted fluctuations (quantified
by the system variance) agree with those from direct simulation. In particular, in the large degree
limit, for a variety of combinations of the network and pinning parameters, the numerical results
approach those predicted from our mean field theory. Our theory also correctly predicts the optimal
pinning fraction for various system and control settings.
In real world systems in which resource allocation is an important component, resource capaci-
ties and agent interactions can be diverse and time dependent. To develop MG model to understand
the effects of diversity and time dependence on herding dynamics, and to exploit the understand-
ing to develop optimal control strategies to suppress or eliminate herding are open issues at the
present. Furthermore, implementation of pinning control in real systems may be associated with
incentive policies that provide compensations or rewards to the pinned agents. How to minimize
the optimal pinning fraction then becomes an interesting issue. Our results provide insights into
these issues, and represent a step toward the goal of designing highly stable and efficient resource
allocation systems in modern society and economy.
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FIG. 1: Variance σ2 as a function of the pinning fraction ρp for scale-free networks of different con-
nection densities. The average degree of the networks for simulation are 〈k〉 = 6, 10, 14, to 40 in (a-d),
respectively, and the value of the pinning pattern indicator η+ ranges from 0.6 to 1.0 for each panel. The
results are averaged over 200 realizations for scale-free networks of size N = 1001 and degree exponent
γ = 3.0.
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FIG. 2: Variance σ2 as a function of the pinning fraction ρp for scale-free networks of varying degrees
of heterogeneity. The scaling exponents of the networks are γ = 2.1, 2.5, 2.7, and 3.0 in (a-d), respectively,
and the value of the pinning pattern indicator η+ ranges from 0.6 to 1.0 for each panel. The results are
averaged over 200 realizations for scale-free networks of size N = 2001 and average degree 〈k〉 ≈ 4.
18
0 200 400 600 800 1000
0.00
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0 200 400 600 800 1000
0.00
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0 200 400 600 800 1000
0.00
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.10
0.12
0 200 400 600 800 1000
0.00
0.04
0.08
0.12
0.16
0.20
+=0.5
 
 
P
(A
)
+=0.7
 
 
(b)
+=0.9
 
 
P
(A
)
A
(c)
+=1.0
(d)
(a)
 
 
A
p=
 0.02
 0.04
 0.1
 0.2  
 0.25
 0.3
 0.4
 0.42
 0.45
 0.5  
 0.6 
 0.7
 0.8  
 0.9
FIG. 3: Theoretical prediction of the probability density distribution of attendance A. The distribution
P (A) is obtained from the transition matrix Eq. (7) for N = 1001. The value of the pinning pattern indicator
η+ is set as 0.5, 0.7, 0.9 and 1.0 in (a-d), respectively, and the pinning fraction ρp ranges from 0.02 to 0.9.
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FIG. 4: Theoretical prediction of the variance σ2 in comparison with the simulation results. The
system has size N = 1001 and power-law degree distribution P (k) with scaling exponent γ = 3. The
theoretical prediction does not depend on the value of the average degree. In direct simulations, the values
of the average degree are 〈k〉 = 6, 10, 14, and 40. In each case, the simulation result is averaged over 200
network realizations. The value of the pinning pattern indicator is set to η+ = 0.8
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FIG. 5: Theoretical prediction of variance σ2 for systems with different degree scaling exponents. The
system has size N = 1001 and power-law degree distribution P (k) with different values of the degree
exponent: (a-d) γ = 2.1, 2.5, 2.7, 3.0, respectively. In each case, the value of the pinning pattern indicator
η+ ranges from 0.6 to 1.0.
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FIG. 6: Optimal pinning fraction. (a) Intersections of the curves y1 = Pp(ρp) and y2 = β · ρp denote
nonzero optimal pinning fraction ρ∗p given by Eq. (18b). The scale-free networks have the degree exponents
γ = 2.1, 2.5, 2.7, and 3.0, respectively. The response function is for F+|− = F−|+ = 1 (corresponding to
C+ = C−). (b) Contour map of ρ∗p in the parameter space of F+|− and F−|+ for scale-free networks with
γ = 3. In the lower-left region below the boundary F+|−+F−|+ = 1 (white dashed line), nonzero solution
of ρ∗p cannot be obtained. (c) Optimal pinning fraction ρ∗p as a function of 1/β for scale-free networks.
The analytical results from Eq. (18b) (red solid curve) and the simulation results (black open squares) agree
well with each other. The red arrow marks the theoretical prediction of the boundary, where nonzero ρ∗p
solutions exist on the left side. (d) For ER random networks, ρ∗p as a function of 1/β. Theoretical results
from Eq. (18b) (red open circle) and simulation results (black open squares) are shown. The boundaries 1
and 2 obtained theoretically (pointed to by solid arrows), respectively, stand for the constraint in Eqs. (19)
and (22). In (c) and (d), the value of F−|+ varies but F+|− is set to 0.9. The scale-free and random networks
used in the simulations have 〈k〉 = 40 and N = 2001.
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FIG. 7: Collapse of κ for different pinning patterns. (a-c) Simulation results of κ from scale-free net-
works for γ = 2.1, 2.7, and 3.0, which correspond to the results of σ2 in Figs. 2(a), 2(c), and 1(d), re-
spectively. (d-f) Theoretical results of κ from Eq. (27) for the cases shown in Figs. 5(a), 5(c), and 5(d),
respectively. The reference pinning pattern indicator is η′ = 0.6.
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FIG. 8: Two separated functions κ and Ω in Eq. (29). (a,b) Collapse of κ(ρp) for various η+ values,
where the reference value is η′+ = 0.7 in (a) and 0.8 in (b). The values of κ are predicted from Eq. (27) for
a scale-free network with γ = 3 and 〈k〉 = 40. (c) The function Ω(η+) for η′+ = 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9, 1.0, and
F+|− = F−|+ = 1.
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